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Abstract
Aaron Ridley has recently attacked the study of musical ontology – an apparently fertile
area in the philosophy of music. I argue here that Ridley’s arguments are unsound. There
are genuinely puzzling ontological questions about music, many of which are closely
related to questions of musical value. While it is true that musical ontology must be
descriptive of pre-existing musical practices and that some debates, such as that over the
creatability of musical works, have little consequence for questions of musical value,
none of this implies that these debates themselves are without value.
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For it is pointless to affect indifference with respect to such [metaphysical]
inquiries, to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent. Moreover,
however much they may think to make themselves unrecognizable by exchanging
the language of the schools for a popular style, these so-called indifferentists, to
the extent that they think anything at all, always unavoidably fall back into
metaphysical assertions, which they yet professed so much to despise. 1

In a recent article, Aaron Ridley, a notable philosopher of music, attacks the study of
musical ontology. 2 His conclusions range in strength from the claim that musical
ontology is ‘absolutely worthless’ (203) to the suggestion that ‘in musical aesthetics,
ontology comes last (at the end of time, perhaps)’ (215). As someone who works in the
field of musical ontology, these claims strike me as wrong. I feel some obligation, then,
to defend the practice of musical ontology – of trying to describe the kinds of musical
things there are, and the relations that hold between them. I think the best way to be
convinced of the value of musical ontology is to read some. To that end, all I can do here
is direct readers elsewhere. But I will also dispatch Ridley’s negative arguments and say
something about the benefits and limits of musical ontology.
I. CONTRA RIDLEY

Ridley’s strategy is as follows. He first argues that musical ontology has no consequences
for musical aesthetics or practice, and that no one is in fact, or should be, puzzled by
questions of musical ontology. (By ‘musical aesthetics’ he seems to mean the study of
questions of musical value.) From this he concludes that no one should engage in debate
over questions of musical ontology. He then argues, contrary to musical ontologists’
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claims that answering questions of value requires an ontological theory, or at least
ontological assumptions, that in fact the reverse holds: the ontological facts about music
depend on facts about its value. Thus the ontologist cannot defend herself by claiming
only to be doing musical metaphysics, divorcing her inquiry from questions of value.
I will argue against each of Ridley’s claims, in reverse order. First, I will show
that Ridley’s main argument about the relationship between musical ontology and value
fails, since it equivocates on the notion of the ‘content’ of a musical work. Second, I will
show that his subsidiary argument – that musical ontology is not worth doing since
genuine ontological questions never arise in musical practice or aesthetics – does not
succeed, and that Ridley fails even to keep controversial ontological assumptions out of
his own article. Third, I will show how the ontology of music can have important
consequences for questions of musical value, though a much more concrete case is made
for this conclusion by actual studies in musical ontology than by my abstract arguments
here.
1.1 Ontology and content
Ridley’s argument against doing musical ontology independently of, or even prior to,
musical value theory is the following.
[A] performance of a work cannot be ‘faithful’ to it unless it evinces an
understanding of it. And if a performance’s faithfulness is, minimally, a matter of
the understanding it shows, then a performance is, in that much, to be valued in
proportion to the richness, depth, insight, subtlety and so on of the understanding
it evinces. But if this is right, evidently enough, much of the ‘content’ of a given
work is only revealed in the understandings that faithful performances of it
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evince. And that means that any attempt to specify that content – the content to
which a good performance is faithful – in advance of evaluative judgements about
particular performances of it, or independently of such judgments, must be futile
and self-defeating.

(213)

(Note that by ‘faithful’, Ridley seems to mean ‘good’, or ‘valuable’, since according to
ordinary usage, but not Ridley’s, one can produce a performance that is faithful to a
work, without its being revelatory, or even particularly interesting.)
The first thing that calls for comment in this passage is Ridley’s apparent
misconception of what it is that musical ontologists do. When he says that much of a
given work’s content is revealed only in performances of it, this is supposed to be a
rebuke to the musical ontologist. But I cannot think of a musical ontologist who would
claim that his or her theory can tell you what the content of a particular work is. Musical
ontologists theorize about the kinds of musical things there are – works, scores,
performances, recordings – and the relations between them. Musicologists (broadly
construed), on the other hand, talk about particular works, performances, scores, and so
on. 3 To give a concrete example, Stephen Davies, in an important recent book on musical
ontology, essays a theory about the relation between a work and a performance of it. He
argues that three necessary conditions jointly suffice for a performance’s being of a
particular work: ‘(1) the performance matches the work’s content, more or less; (2) the
performers intend to follow most of the instructions specifying the work, whoever wrote
them; and (3) a robust causal chain runs from the performance to the work’s creation’. 4
In a later article on profundity in instrumental music, Davies puts on his musicologist’s
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hat to give an analysis of the first movement of Bartók’s Music for Strings, Percussion,
and Celesta. The analysis ends with the following paragraph:
Here is the miracle. The closing three measures not only draw the movement to its
close, they recapitulate and thereby summarize the whole movement’s structure.
The two voices move in contrary motion from A, settle simultaneously on E-flat,
the tritone, and then reverse the process until they converge in unison on the final
A. 5
You might wonder how on earth Davies derives these details about Bartók’s piece from
his account of the relation between work and performance, quoted above. But I suspect
that you don’t. Clearly, an account of the kind of thing a musical work is will not tell you
anything about the content of a particular work or performance. For those details, you
must examine the work in question; but then you are engaged in musicology, not musical
ontology.
Comparing music with literature helps to point up the problem with Ridley’s talk
of the ‘content’ of a musical work. In one sense of ‘content’ – equivalent to what usually
goes by the name of ‘meaning’ in literary discourse – it is plausible that we couldn’t hope
to say what the content of a work is, in advance of ‘faithful’ (good) interpretations of it.
(It does not follow that the work does not have that content in advance of those
interpretations, but I ignore this issue here.) In another sense of content, though – that
which we would use to check whether we had a faithful copy of the text (in the ordinary
sense of ‘faithful’) – clearly we could know the content of the work in advance of any
interpretations of it. Given enough time, I could tell you whether you have a faithful copy
of Finnegans Wake, though I have next to no understanding of that work. 6
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Once we have sorted out these senses of content, we can read Ridley’s argument
in two ways. The charitable reading is to use the deep sense of content, or meaning, in
which case the conclusion is that any attempt to specify the content of a work in advance
of a good interpretation of it would be futile. I say ‘good interpretation’ rather than
‘faithful performance’ because (i) as noted above, Ridley uses ‘faithful’ in a non-standard
way, and (ii) he includes among performances those ‘in one’s head’, which makes his
denial of the possibility of achieving an understanding of a work in advance of hearing a
performance of it more plausible. 7 On this reading, Ridley’s argument seems defensible,
if trivial. The drawback is that on this reading the argument fails to connect with Ridley’s
main concerns in his article, for ‘content’, in the sense being used, is not the kind of thing
musical ontologists describe. In order to reach the strong conclusion about musical
ontology Ridley is aiming for, we must read ‘faithful performance’ more literally, and
give ‘content’ its shallower meaning of just what would determine whether or not we
have a performance of the work. But on this reading, the argument is indefensible, for the
reasons given above – anyone with access to a copy of the score and the ability to read it
can tell you to a large extent the content a performance would need to have were it to be a
performance of this work.8
1.2 Aesthetics without ontology?
A second argument Ridley employs is that we are never genuinely confused or puzzled
about the ontology of the music we listen to, so there is no point in theorizing about it.
This sounds extremely odd coming from a philosopher. Whoever ‘we’ is supposed to
refer to here, it must exclude musical ontologists, since they will certainly claim to be
puzzled, and perhaps even confused, about the ontology of the music they are listening
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to. Consider, for comparison, the plausible claim that ‘we’ are never genuinely confused
or puzzled about whether we know anything, or whether other people have experiences
like we do, or whether I’m the same person who went to sleep in my bed last night. These
claims don’t carry much weight with epistemologists, philosophers of mind, or
metaphysicians. Yet Ridley is arguing that musical ontologists should be silenced on the
basis of such considerations. As I see it, no one should be forced to consider these
questions (introductory philosophy courses notwithstanding), but neither should anyone
be compelled not to consider them. A reasonable response to this defence might be that
epistemologists et al. are able to show quickly that there are no obvious answers in their
fields of inquiry, and thus that they are not (necessarily) wasting their time addressing the
issues that interest them. Thus the musical ontologist is at least beholden to show
likewise that questions of musical ontology are not easy to answer. Ridley wisely does
not parlay this response, nor does he attempt to provide the easy answers to any musicontological questions. 9 Rather, he claims that
I have not [committed myself to a whole set of ontological claims throughout the
course of my own argument] 10.…All I have argued is that performances can show
us things about works; and that requires nothing more than the thought that
(some) performances are interpretations of works – not, I surmise, a proposition
likely to provoke a storm of protest, and certainly not one that presupposes (or
should prompt) the slightest flicker of ontological reflection.…At most, I have
helped myself to some perfectly neutral, pre-theoretical thoughts. And these are of
a sort that no one, whatever their ontological views, could possibly object to….
(219)
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The idea is that we can do all of musical aesthetics in this ontologically neutral mode.
But, in fact, much of what Ridley says does imply some substantive ontological
presuppositions, and certainly prompts ontological reflection in those predisposed to such
reflection. Showing this will be enough to put musical ontology on a par with the other
philosophical inquiries mentioned above.
One example of Ridley’s not-so-neutral ontological assumptions follows his
discussion of Davies’s proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for a performance’s
being of a given work, quoted above. Ridley says that
if, as I have argued, a revelatory performance is one that is faithful to a work in a
way that necessarily defies specification in advance, then, first, as a performance
that is faithful to the work it is, trivially, of it, and second, amongst its
unforeseeable qualities may well be the disregard of any, or even of all, of the
independently specifiable bits of ‘content’ that it was supposed, as a legitimate
performance, to have to match.

(214)

Is any performance that reveals something about a work trivially a performance of it?
Performances of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony have revealed things to me about
Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique. But I would not agree that the former were
performances of the latter. Is Ridley truly making the trivial claim, then, that any
authentic, or faithful, or true, performance of a work is a performance of that work? His
second claim belies this reading. It is that such a performance need not include any of the
instruments, pitches, tonal structure, etc., that many theorists argue are constitutive of
such works. But without further explanation (which Ridley does not provide), this means
that a performance apparently of the Symphonie Fantastique may well in fact be a
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performance of Beethoven’s Ninth. This conclusion seems just the sort of ‘wildly
implausible’ claim that Ridley (203) accuses Nelson Goodman of making in Languages
of Art,11 thereby kicking off the unhealthy obsession with ontology that philosophers of
music now supposedly suffer from. I am certainly prompted to wonder on quite what
grounds Ridley would claim that a certain performance is or is not of a particular work.
Whatever they are, they are clearly not neutral, pre-theoretical assumptions that no
ontologist could possibly object to.
1.3 Ontology and value
Thus far I have shown that Ridley’s two main arguments for the thesis that we should
abandon musical ontology are unsound. We need not rely on value judgments about a
particular performance to determine whether or not it is a performance of a particular
work, nor is it the case that questions of musical ontology do not arise for a
philosophically-minded person interested in music. Moreover, Ridley himself has failed
to write his article using only neutral, pre-theoretical assumptions about musical
ontology. Perhaps Ridley’s negative arguments can be strengthened, but rather than
attempt that here, I prefer to provide a positive argument for the relevance of ontological
considerations to judgments of musical value. If musical value judgments presuppose
ontological judgments, then Ridley’s arguments must fail.
Ridley asks, ‘How, exactly, is a convincing ontological backdrop supposed to
lend perspicuity to evaluative questions? No one, so far as I am aware, has actually asked
this: certainly no one has given any sort of explicit answer’ (210). Most philosophers of
art take Kendall Walton to have asked this, and closely related questions, in ‘Categories
of Art’. 12 Walton also gives an explicit answer. The simplest way of explaining his
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argument is through his fictional example of guernicas. A guernica is a particular kind of
work of art in a particular alien tradition.
Guernicas are like versions of Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ done in various bas-relief
dimensions. All of them are surfaces with the colors and shapes of Picasso’s
‘Guernica,’ but the surfaces are molded to protrude from the wall like relief maps
of different kinds of terrain. Some guernicas have rolling surfaces, others are
sharp and jagged, still others contain several relatively flat planes at various
angles to each other, and so forth. 13
It so happens that sharp, jagged guernicas are dynamic and vital, expressive of anger,
violence, and so on, while rolling guernicas are smooth, soft, and gentle. 14 The shapes
that we see in Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ do not play any more expressive or representational
role in guernicas than the flatness of the canvas does in (our) paintings. Clearly, if
someone who knew nothing about painting, but a lot about guernicas, saw Picasso’s
‘Guernica’, they would (erroneously taking it to be a guernica) describe it as ‘cold, stark,
lifeless, or serene and restful, or perhaps bland, dull, boring – but in any case not violent,
dynamic, and vital’. 15 The people from the alien culture would misdescribe Picasso’s
work, because they would take it to be of a kind of which it is not. This sort of
misdescription could easily result in a misevaluation. (Perhaps flat guernicas were all the
rage in the ’60s, but everyone is just so over them now.)
Walton gives a parallel argument in a musical idiom in a later essay. 16 Here, he
asks us to imagine a Martian musical tradition.
Martian scores do not indicate what pitches a performer is to play, or for what
durations. Instead they give detailed instructions concerning dynamics, tempos,
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articulations, vibrato, nuances of accent and timbre, etc. – instructions that are
much more detailed than those provided by (traditional) scores in our society. The
performer of a Martian work is free to decide what pitches to play and for what
durations, but he is expected to play them with the dynamics, articulations,
timbres, etc., indicated by the composer. Different performers playing from the
same score will of course play different pitches and rhythms (and hence different
harmonies and harmonic rhythms) in executing the composer’s instructions, just
as on Earth different performers play the notes…specified by the composer with
different dynamics, tempos, and articulations. 17
You can see where this is going. You might end up with a performance of a Martian work
that sounds to us exactly like a performance of Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony. A
classical-music lover will not be in a position to judge the performance as the thing that it
is, namely, a performance of Marthoven’s Sixth.
Ridley might claim that that these fanciful examples are of little interest, since we
never actually encounter such problems. We operate, he claims, with ‘an apparently
rather robust sense of work identity’ (207). He considers purportedly difficult borderline
cases and first performances of works, but argues that these never in fact present us with
real ontological questions or confusion. But if our sense of work identity is so robust that
it doesn’t present us with any problems, why is it that philosophers of music over the past
forty years have been unable to reach a consensus as to what that sense is? Why doesn’t
Ridley simply say what this sense is, if he wants to end ontological speculation? Clearly
we do have some shared sense of work identity, otherwise we would not be able to begin
to do musical ontology. But it seems equally clear that this sense is not a fully worked-
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out or robust one, otherwise there would be no ontological confusion, or disagreements
between musical ontologists. 18 Moreover, as I argued above, the fact, if it were one, that
we are not presented with actual hard cases in our everyday musical activities would not
show that musical ontology is worthless, any more than the fact that we are not regularly
presented with purported time-travel machines shows that the possibility of time travel
should not be pursued as a metaphysical question. Most importantly, though, we are in
fact presented with hard cases and cases of confusion relatively commonly (that is, much
more commonly than we are presented with purported time machines, or the
transmigration of princes’ souls into cobblers’ bodies). Real examples are available.
II. SOME BENEFITS OF DOING MUSICAL ONTOLOGY

Cases of ontological confusion are difficult to find in the Western classical tradition,
partly because the tradition is such an old one, so that there is, as Ridley points out, a
relatively widely shared sense of what a work is, and what counts as a performance of
one. This makes it less likely that people will disagree about a particular case, or that
practitioners or outsiders will flout, or be unaware of, the conventions – some of the
circumstances that result in hard cases. Similarly, because of the culturally entrenched
view of classical music as superior, it is difficult to find criticisms of the entire tradition
that are arguably rooted in ontological misunderstandings, as opposed to similar
criticisms of ‘popular’ traditions, such as rock and jazz. 19
Nevertheless, real cases of ontological confusion or disagreement can be found
within the classical tradition. 20 For convenience, I will take my examples from the very
paper in which Ridley argues they do not exist. A favourite example of Ridley’s is
‘muzak’d versions of the Ode to Joy theme’ (207 et passim).
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One would not suffer as one does in elevators and supermarkets if the doubts
[about whether one is hearing a performance of the Ode to Joy theme] were real.
One would not be reduced to misanthropic cursings, to mutterings of ‘How could
they? How dare they?’ if it really did strike one as a serious possibility that the
miserable denatured pap oozing from the speakers was not the Beethoven after
all. It clearly is the Beethoven, and that is why it makes one feel so low and
vicious.

(207)

It is notable that Ridley identifies as his target the theme from the Ode to Joy, rather than
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, or its fourth movement, or a section of that movement.
For surely there would be disagreement about a claim that the recording he hears in the
supermarket is a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. But if it is Beethoven
Ridley is listening to, why the anger? Apparently because it is such a bad performance.
But would such rage result from even the most appalling imaginable live performance of
the symphony by a full orchestra? I suspect not. Part of the reason for this is that the Ode
to Joy theme is quite unremarkable. 21 It is a commonplace in analyses of the Ninth
Symphony that the theme that emerges low in the strings, early in the final movement,
from the detritus of the preceding three movements, seems far too slight to bear the
weight of this great symphony to its conclusion. One of the remarkable things about the
work is that Beethoven shows these appearances to be deceiving. The greatness of the
Ninth (or even its fourth movement) was surely not simply lying in wait in the Ode to Joy
theme, to be discovered by any nineteenth-century composer with a reasonable grasp of
harmony, counterpoint, and orchestration. Thus, part of what explains Ridley’s despair at
the muzak’d Ode is that it untimely rips the theme from the context that makes it part of
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something great.22 No one versed in classical music can keep Beethoven’s symphony out
of his mind on hearing the Ode to Joy theme, and the inevitable comparison between
Beethoven’s symphony and the piece of Muzak is bound to find the Muzak wanting. The
moral outrage Ridley expresses (‘How could they? How dare they?’) is in part explained
by the fact that we take works, not parts thereof (such as the Ode theme), as the primary
products of artists. Perhaps there is no ontological confusion in Ridley’s account of his
encounter with the muzak’d Ode. But the above analysis shows that his account certainly
raises ontological questions that help to bring the issues he is concerned with into focus.
Another group of ontological issues is raised by some ground-clearing Ridley
does early on in his article. He notes that he will use the term ‘performance’ broadly: ‘By
“performance” I will mean not only the playing of a musical work by an individual or
group before an audience, but also recordings, transcriptions, arrangements, versions and,
in general, renditions of every sort’ (206). This seems a reasonably homogeneous set of
things to bring under one term, and whether Ridley chooses ‘performance’ as his term is
more or less a verbal issue, provided he does not equivocate on it. But it does simply
sweep many ontological questions under the mat. For instance, Ridley is careful to say
that the Muzak recording he hears in the supermarket is a ‘version’ of the Ode to Joy
theme, as noted above. Why not simply say it is a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth
Symphony? I am not suggesting that that is the best way to characterize it, but it certainly
accords with Ridley’s terminology, and his choice not to use the term he has just defined
in the previous paragraph reveals, I think, that there are interesting questions to be asked
about when something is or is not a performance of something else.
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A second issue raised by his stipulative use of ‘performance’ is the question of
whether recordings are in fact best characterized as performances of works. I have argued
elsewhere that typical recordings in the Western classical tradition are best characterized
as giving access to performances, on a par with attendance at a live performance, 23 but
there are people who disagree. Some think, for instance, that almost all sound recordings
are works of art in their own right. 24 It is easy to see the relationship between these
disputes and evaluative issues. If the high Cs you hear on a recording of Tristan und
Isolde are not in fact sung by Kirsten Flagstad, but by Elisabeth Schwarzkopf, while
Flagstad sings all of Isolde’s other notes, and is alone listed as Isolde on the cover, is
Flagstad (or someone else) cheating? She would be in a live performance, but if
recordings are different kinds of works, standardly employing all manner of ‘studio
trickery’, perhaps she is not. 25
There is another kind of case in which ontological confusion results in evaluative
mistakes. There may develop two musical traditions that display many similarities, yet
are ontologically quite different. The traditions may share roughly the same harmonic and
melodic language, for instance, but one may be a tradition of live performances of
enduring works, while another is centrally improvisatory. In such cases, it will be
tempting to judge performances in the two traditions on the same grounds, since the same
kinds of descriptive musicological judgments may apply to performances in both
traditions. But evaluative judgments will not follow automatically from such descriptions.
It is difficult to write a good fugue, which is part of the reason why good fugues, and
performances of them, are valued. But it is even more difficult to improvise a good fugue,
and thus we tend to value equally good, but improvised, performances of fugues even
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more highly than those of ‘pre-composed’ fugues. If someone does not recognize that a
certain performance is improvised, but rather assumes that it is a performance of a
composed work, she will tend to undervalue the performance. Thus, approaching an
improvisatory tradition as if it were one of composed works will result in thoroughgoing
misevaluation.
It is this sort of ontological confusion that ontologists of rock and jazz music are
attempting to untangle. 26 For instance, in my view, rock music is centrally an artform in
which recordings are the works of art, unlike Western classical music, which is a tradition
wherein works are for performance, while in jazz there are no works, only performances.
There is no space here to defend these particular views, but it should be clear that if they
are correct there will be implications for evaluative judgments of these kinds of music. 27
III. SOME LIMITS OF MUSICAL ONTOLOGY

While I do not think Ridley’s arguments are sound, I do accept two theses about musical
ontology that might be considered much milder versions of some of the claims he makes,
though I accept them for somewhat different reasons. The distance between his claims
and mine can be gauged from the fact that while his imply that musical ontology should
be abandoned, mine merely describe some limits on musical ontology.
The first thesis can be seen as taking the hyperbole out of what for Ridley is a
concession – that perhaps musical ontology can be done ‘at the end of time’ (215). One
thing that most musical ontologists (and ontologists of art in general) accept is that,
whatever the status of general metaphysics, musical (and art) ontology is descriptive. 28
This is less controversial in musical ontology than in general metaphysics because music
is a human practice, and thus it is less controversial that the objects of inquiry in musical
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ontology are dependent on human minds in some sense. Exactly what sense is a matter of
debate, of course. Nonetheless, it follows that the study of musical ontology must come
after a musical practice is established. If this is not the end of time exactly, it is at least
later than one might address other philosophical questions about music. 29
A second thesis I subscribe to is a distant cousin of Ridley’s claim that ‘there is no
obvious sense in which [a musical ontologist] is engaged in philosophical aesthetics at
all. At best, and instead, one might be engaged in the metaphysics of music, and that is a
very different activity’ (208). I would say rather that some kinds of ontological inquiry
are more closely linked to questions of musical value than others. Of course, if my
arguments above are sound, this will provide no reason for anyone to stop what they are
doing – it is not hopeless to engage in musical ontology before you have figured out a
theory of musical value, for instance. But I also disagree with Ridley about which
ontological questions are most distant from matters of value. Ridley’s central example of
a worthless ontological pursuit is the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions on
a performance’s being of a particular work. However, even Ridley does not deny the
commonplace among those familiar with Western classical music that accuracy, or
faithfulness to the work, is one important factor in the evaluation of a performance.
A better example, I think, is the on-going debate over the fundamental
metaphysical nature of musical works in themselves (as opposed to their relations to
performances). The theories put forward on this issue in the twentieth century read like a
survey of general metaphysics. There have been idealists, 30 nominalists, 31 event
theorists, 32 realists, 33 and even the odd eliminativist. 34 Recently, the consensus has
favoured realism – the view that musical works are abstract objects – with the central
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dispute being whether or not such abstracta can be created. 35 This debate, it seems to me,
might be more fairly characterized as ‘musical metaphysics’ than the debate over the
conditions on work performances that Ridley fixes upon, since it is independent of most,
if not all, questions of musical value. 36 Just as any solution to the problem of universals
must make some sense of our claims that two cakes have the same shape, any solution to
the question of the fundamental nature of a musical work must make some sense of our
claims that two performances are of the same work. Thus, any evaluative questions that
hang on the latter issue will not trickle down to the more fundamental metaphysical
debate. 37
Finally, it is worth mentioning again the growing interest in comparative
ontology. Recent work on the ontology of rock, jazz, and non-Western music, like the
debate over the conditions on a work performance, takes for granted that some sense can
be made of repeatable musical objects. The debate is rather about the roles those objects
play in the musical practice in question. Is a rock recording some sort of representation of
a work-performance, like a classical recording, or is it a work of art in its own right? This
sort of question is clearly related to questions of musical value in two ways. First, in
order to answer the question, one must look at the musical practice involved, including
evaluative practices. If recordings are given primacy of place in the rock tradition, then
that is one reason in favour of considering them to be works. Second, as mentioned
above, part of the motivation for addressing these issues in the first place is putative
evaluative errors that have been made in part on the basis of a misunderstanding of the
ontology of the music involved.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS

Aaron Ridley’s arguments that musical ontology is worthless are unsound. There are
genuinely puzzling ontological questions about music, many of which are closely related
to questions of musical value. While it is true that musical ontology must be descriptive
of pre-existing musical practices and that some debates, such as that over the creatability
of musical works, have little consequence for questions of musical value, none of this
implies that these debates themselves are without value. 38

Andrew Kania, Department of Philosophy, Trinity University, One Trinity Place, San
Antonio, TX 78212, USA. Email: akania@trinity.edu
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